Ravindu FernandoApplication Security Consultant

Industry · Telecoms

Keep self-care, top-ups and APIs working under constant bot pressure

I assess the edge, APIs and apps your subscribers use every day, find where bots and abuse get through, and show which fixes cut the most risk first.

In short

Application security for telecom operators covers the self-care portal and app, top-up and bundle APIs (application programming interfaces), partner and reseller channels, and the long tail of campaign sites. I assess bot and DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) readiness at the edge, authorisation on subscriber APIs, and the forgotten applications still live on your domains. You get a ranked plan; delivery is scoped separately if needed.

Where I usually start

  • WAAP & API protection assessment
  • Exposure management (CTEM) assessment
  • Application architecture review

The pressure

What telecoms security teams are up against.

  • Bots at subscriber scaleLarge subscriber bases mean login, OTP and top-up endpoints draw constant automated abuse.
  • Sprawling domainsYears of campaigns, agencies and acquisitions leave sites and APIs that nobody remembers owning.
  • The number is the keyA phone number receives bank and wallet OTPs, so subscriber accounts are worth taking over.
  • Availability is the productAn outage of self-care or top-up during a launch or holiday is visible to every customer at once.

Attack scenarios

The attacks I test your defences against.

Each scenario maps to one of the six areas, so you can see which layer should have stopped it.

Try the attack simulator
  • Scenario 01Account takeover for data bundlesBots try leaked passwords on self-care logins, then redeem bundles and loyalty points from hijacked accounts.Edge & WAAP
  • Scenario 02Subscriber lookup by phone numberA self-care API returns name, ID number and plan details for any phone number passed to it.API security
  • Scenario 03Modified self-care appA tampered build skips client-side checks and calls bundle APIs directly to claim offers it should not get.Mobile apps
  • Scenario 04Forgotten campaign micrositeA promotion site an agency built years ago is still live on the main domain, unpatched and unowned.Vulnerabilities & exposure

Rules you work under

The frameworks I map findings to.

Findings are written so your risk, audit and compliance teams can use them directly. This is orientation, not legal advice.

  • Parliament of Sri LankaPersonal Data Protection Act, No. 9 of 2022Subscriber identity, location and usage data held by self-care apps and APIs falls under this Act.
  • PCI Security Standards CouncilPayment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) v4.0.1Card top-ups and bill payments in apps and portals bring those payment flows into scope.
  • National Cybersecurity Authority, Saudi ArabiaEssential Cybersecurity Controls (ECC)Applies to Saudi government bodies and critical infrastructure operators, and includes web application security controls.
  • ISO and IECISO/IEC 27001:2022Widely used by operators. Secure development and security testing of applications sit inside its control set.

FAQ

Telecoms: questions I get asked

Ask me something else
Why are telecom self-care apps a target for attackers?

A subscriber account holds more than airtime. It can redeem bundles and loyalty points, reveal personal details, and the number behind it receives one-time passwords for banks and wallets. That makes self-care logins worth attacking at scale with bots. Weak authorisation on self-care APIs (application programming interfaces) can also expose subscriber details to anyone who passes in a phone number.

How do you find forgotten applications on a telecom estate?

I combine DNS (Domain Name System) records, certificate transparency logs, cloud and CDN (content delivery network) settings, scanner data and WAF (web application firewall) traffic into one list of what is actually exposed, then match it against owners. Campaign microsites, old partner integrations and test environments are the usual surprises. Each one is retired, put behind the edge or given an owner.

Can a WAAP stop bot attacks on login and top-up pages?

A WAAP (web application and API protection) platform with bot management helps, but only once it is tuned to your traffic. Telecom logins see many real users behind shared mobile network addresses, so simple rate limits per IP (internet protocol) address block customers. Behavioural and device signals work better. I check whether bot controls actually enforce on login, OTP (one-time password) and top-up flows, rather than only monitoring.

Do telecom operators need mobile app protection?

For apps that handle top-ups, bundles, payments or wallet features, yes. Runtime protection detects rooted phones, hooking tools and modified copies of the app. It does not replace authorisation on the server, because attackers can call the APIs (application programming interfaces) directly. I usually assess the app and its APIs together, so protection effort goes where money and data actually move.

How long does a telecom application security assessment take?

An assessment of WAAP (web application and API protection) and bot controls typically takes two to four weeks, depending on how many domains, apps and partner integrations are in scope. A review of a single platform takes one to three weeks. Ravindu Fernando, a Colombo-based application security consultant, agrees the scope and a fixed fee before work starts, after a free first call.

For telecoms teams

Let’s find your gaps before someone else does.

Tell me what you are protecting. You will leave the call knowing whether an assessment makes sense and what it would cover.